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I ssues relating to fi nancial stability have always been part of the macroeco-nomics curriculum, but they have often been presented as mainly of historical interest, or primarily of relevance to emerging markets. However, the recent 
fi nancial crisis has made it plain that even in economies like the United States, 
signifi cant disruptions of fi nancial intermediation remain a possibility. Under-
standing such phenomena and the possible policy responses requires the use of 
a macroeconomic framework in which fi nancial intermediation matters for the 
allocation of resources.
In this paper, I fi rst discuss why neither standard macroeconomic models that 
abstract from fi nancial intermediation nor traditional models of the “bank lending 
channel” are adequate as a basis for understanding the recent crisis. I argue that 
instead we need models in which intermediation plays a crucial role, but in which 
intermediation is modeled in a way that better conforms to current institutional 
realities. In particular, we need models that recognize that a market-based fi nan-
cial system—one in which intermediaries fund themselves by selling securities in 
competitive markets, rather than collecting deposits subject to reserve require-
ments—is not the same as a frictionless system.
I then sketch the basic elements of an approach that allows fi nancial inter-
mediation and credit frictions to be integrated into macroeconomic analysis in a 
straightforward way. I show how the model can be used to analyze the macroeco-
nomic consequences of the recent fi nancial crisis and conclude with a discussion of 
some implications of the model for the conduct of monetary policy.
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Why a New Framework for Macroeconomic Analysis is Needed
It may be useful fi rst to review why familiar macroeconomic models do not 
already incorporate the features needed to make sense of recent economic devel-
opments. I shall argue that it is diffi cult to understand why either the signifi cant 
decline in house prices since 2006 or the substantial losses sustained by fi nancial 
fi rms should have so seriously affected aggregate employment and economic 
activity except in the context of a model in which fi nancial intermediaries play a 
crucial role and in which their ability to fulfi ll that function can at some times be 
signifi cantly impaired.
Housing Prices and Aggregate Demand
While the severity of the recent fi nancial crisis has been extensively discussed, 
some have questioned whether it was really the primary cause of the Great Recession. 
For example, Baker (2010) argues that a substantial reduction in aggregate demand 
can be explained as a wealth effect on consumer expenditure, given the decline 
in U.S. households’ housing wealth by several trillion dollars. In this analysis, “the 
problem is not fi rst and foremost a fi nancial crisis.” But as Buiter (2010) points out, 
there is no aggregate wealth effect of a decline in housing prices, since the house-
hold sector in aggregate is both the owner of the housing stock and the consumer 
of the services supplied by it. A fall in house prices reduces the value of an asset, 
but also reduces the cost of buying the stream of housing services that people were 
planning to purchase by exactly the same amount.
It is possible to have a nonzero effect on aggregate expenditure on other goods 
(when other prices remain unchanged), even without fi nancial frictions, owing to 
redistribution of wealth between households with a net “long” position in housing 
and those with net “short” positions, if the average marginal propensities to consume 
out of wealth are different between the two types. Nonetheless, because the positive 
and negative wealth effects will largely offset one another, the effect on aggregate 
demand is likely to be fairly small relative to the size of the aggregate decrease in 
housing wealth.
Larger effects are instead possible if one recognizes that the losses resulting 
from the collapse of housing prices were disproportionately concentrated in certain 
fi nancial institutions which play a role in the allocation of resources that cannot 
easily be replaced by those to whom wealth was redistributed. A model of this kind 
is sketched below. For a quantitative analysis of the effects of the fall in U.S. housing 
prices that stresses such effects, see Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap, and Shin (2008).
Banking and the Money Supply
It is also diffi cult to understand why large losses by fi nancial institutions on 
housing-related bets should have such a signifi cant effect on the real economy 
without a model that takes account of credit frictions. According to the well-known 
monetarist view, banking crises affect the economy because they reduce the total 
supply of money in the economy, since the “money multiplier”—the factor by which 
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the economy’s money supply exceeds the “monetary base” supplied by the central 
bank—falls when funds are withdrawn from commercial banks in response to 
concerns about their stability. The lower money supply is then only consistent with 
money demand to the extent that money demand is also reduced, through some 
combination of lower economic activity and defl ation. This is the classic account by 
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) of how the widespread bank failures in the United 
States deepened the Great Depression.
However, such a model, at least as conventionally elaborated, cannot explain 
why the recent problems of the fi nancial sector should have caused a sharp reces-
sion, for the Friedman–Schwartz story depends on the monetary base remaining 
fi xed despite a collapse of the money multiplier. But under contemporary insti-
tutional arrangements, the Fed automatically adjusts the supply of base money as 
necessary to maintain its target for the federal funds interest rate; thus, any change 
in the money multiplier due to a banking crisis should automatically be offset by a 
corresponding increase in the monetary base, neutralizing any effect on interest 
rates, infl ation, or output.1
Moreover, many of the institutions whose failure or near-failure appeared to 
do the most damage in the recent crisis, such as Lehman Brothers, did not issue 
liabilities that would count as part of Friedman and Schwartz’s measure of the 
money supply. Under a classic monetarist view, the failure of such institutions 
should pose no threat to the aggregate economy. (Hence the proposals by some 
that fi nance can remain only lightly regulated, as long as commercial banks are 
strictly excluded from the riskier activities.) But the consequences of the failure 
of Lehman suggest otherwise.
Models of the Bank Lending Channel
Models that postulate an essential role for banks in fi nancing certain kinds of 
expenditure are better able to explain how a fi nancial crisis could have such dire conse-
quences for the real economy as we have observed. However, the kinds of fi nancial 
constraints that were emphasized in many past models of this kind assumed specifi c 
institutional forms and regulatory requirements that have become less relevant to the 
U.S. fi nancial system over time.
Consider, for example, traditional accounts of the “bank lending channel” of 
the transmission of monetary policy. This argument emphasized the indispensable 
role of commercial banks as sources of credit for certain kinds of borrowers, in 
particular those without direct access to capital markets. Deposits were in turn held 
to be an indispensable source of funding for the lending of commercial banks, and 
these were subject to legal reserve requirements. To the extent that reserve require-
ments were typically a binding constraint, a reduction in the supply of reserves by 
the Federal Reserve would require the volume of deposits to be reduced, which 
1 For example, in the model without credit frictions expounded in Figure 2 below, a banking panic 
that reduces the money multiplier will have no effect other than to increase the supply of base money 
required to implement the central bank reaction function represented by the schedule MP.
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would in turn require less lending by commercial banks. Bernanke and Blinder 
(1988) and Kashyap and Stein (1994) offer expositions of this view; Smant (2002) 
provides a critical review of the literature.
Clearly, the importance of this channel for effects of monetary policy on 
economic activity depended on the validity of each of the links in the proposed 
mechanism: that reserve requirements were a binding constraint for many banks; 
that commercial banks lacked sources of funding other than deposits; that an 
important subset of borrowers lacked sources of credit other than commercial 
banks; and that banks lacked opportunities to substitute between other assets and 
lending to bank-dependent borrowers. Each of these assumptions was less obviously 
defensible after the fi nancial innovations and regulatory changes of the 1980s and 
1990s. Adrian and Shin (forthcoming a, b) discuss the changing structure of the 
U.S. fi nancial system in more detail.
Nonbank fi nancial intermediaries became increasingly important as sources of 
credit, particularly as a result of the growing popularity of securitization. Figure 1A 
shows the contributions of several categories of fi nancial institutions to total net 
lending in the United States; while commercial banks are clearly still important, 
they are far from the only important source of credit. More importantly, both the 
recent lending boom and the more recent fi nancial crisis had more to do with 
changes in fi nancial fl ows of several of the other types shown in the fi gure; for 
example, lending by issuers of asset-backed securities surged in the period up until 
the summer of 2007 and then crashed, while lending by market-based mutual funds 
and other market-based fi nancial intermediaries2 crashed after the fall of 2008.
Nor are deposits the main source of funding for the fi nancial sector, even in 
the case of commercial banks. Figure 1B shows the net increase in fi nancial sector 
liabilities each quarter from several sources. Checkable deposits are only a small 
part of the sector’s fi nancing; moreover, deposits shrank during the years of the 
lending boom, but have risen again during the crisis—so that neither the growth in 
credit during the boom nor the contraction of credit in 2008–09 can be attributed 
to variations in the availability of deposits as a source of fi nancing. Even to the 
extent that deposits do matter, one may doubt the extent to which the availability of 
such funding is constrained by reserve requirements, as in recent years these have 
ceased to be a binding constraint for many banks (for example, see Bennett and 
Peristiani, 2002).
In response to skepticism about the relevance of the traditional bank lending 
channel, Bernanke and Gertler (1995) have instead stressed the importance of 
an alternative “broad credit channel,” in which the balance sheets of ultimate 
borrowers constrain the amount that they are able to borrow; models incorpo-
rating such effects include those of Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Bernanke, 
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). However, the recent crisis, at least in its initial phase, 
2 This category includes mutual funds, the government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs), GSE-backed mort-
gage pools, fi nance companies, real-estate investment trusts, broker-dealers, and funding corporations. 
The “market-based fi nancial intermediaries” terminology derives from Adrian and Shin (forthcoming a).
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Figure 1
Financial Flows over the Most Recent Credit Cycle
Source: Federal Reserve Board, Flow of Funds Accounts.
A: Contributions to U.S. Total Net Lending from Several Categories of Financial
Institutions
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resulted more from obstacles to credit supply, resulting from developments in the 
fi nancial sector itself, than from a reduction in credit demand owing to the prob-
lems of ultimate borrowers.
Hence, what is needed is a framework for macroeconomic analysis in which 
intermediation plays a crucial role and in which frictions that can impede an 
effi cient supply of credit are allowed for, a framework which also takes account of 
the fact that the U.S. fi nancial sector is now largely market-based. Fortunately, the 
development of a new generation of macroeconomic models with these features 
is now well underway. Adrian and Shin (forthcoming b) and Gertler and Kiyotaki 
(forthcoming) provide surveys of recent work in this area. Here, I sketch a basic 
version of such a model, show how it can be used to interpret the recent crisis, 
and then discuss some implications of a model of this kind for monetary policy. A 
complete monetary dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model based on the 
approach sketched here is developed in Cúrdia and Woodford (2009).
Credit and Economic Activity: A Market-Based Approach
The theory sketched here is appropriate to a market-based fi nancial system in 
which the most important marginal suppliers of credit are no longer commercial 
banks and in which deposits subject to reserve requirements are no longer the most 
important marginal source of funding even for commercial banks.
Macroeconomics with a Single Interest Rate
It is useful to begin by recalling how interest-rate policy affects aggregate 
activity in a conventional model that abstracts from fi nancial frictions. In the 
simplest versions of such models, fi nancial conditions can be summarized by a single 
interest rate, the equilibrium value of which is determined in a market for credit. 
Figure 2A shows the key equilibrium condition. The loan supply schedule LS shows 
the amount of lending L that ultimate savers are willing to fi nance (by refraining 
from expenditure themselves) for each possible value of the interest rate i received 
by savers, while the loan demand schedule LD shows the demand for such funds 
for each possible value of the interest rate that must be paid by borrowers. Note 
that the slopes for the curves LS and LD both refl ect the same principle, which is 
that a higher interest rate gives both savers and borrowers a reason to defer current 
spending to a greater extent. Equilibrium in the credit market then determines 
both a market-clearing interest rate and an equilibrium volume of lending, as shown 
by i1 and L1 in the fi gure.
In Figure 2A, the loan supply and demand curves are specifi ed while holding 
constant a great many variables other than the current interest rate. In particular, 
the curves are shown assuming a particular level of current-period aggregate output 
(and hence income) Y. A higher level of income should increase the supply of loans 
at any given interest rate (as not all of the additional income should be consumed 
if future income expectations are held fi xed); hence an increase in Y should shift 
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Figure 2
Interest-Rate and Output Determination in the Standard Model
Notes: In panel A, LS is the loan supply schedule and LD is the loan demand schedule, which are specifi ed 
holding constant aggregate income, Y. The arrows show how the curves shift with an increase in Y.
Panel B shows an IS schedule, derived by tracing out the equilibrium interest rate for any assumed 
level of current income Y, and a monetary policy reaction function (MP ), showing how the central 
bank’s interest rate target will vary with the level of economic activity. The MP curve is drawn for a given 
infl ation rate. The arrow shows the consequence of an exogenous shift in the policy reaction function 
that implies a lower interest rate for any given level of economic activity.
 A: Effect of an Increase in Aggregate Income on Loan Supply and Demand
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the LS curve down and to the right, as shown by the arrow. It should also reduce 
the demand for loans, insofar as borrowers have more current income available 
out of which to fi nance current spending needs or opportunities, in which case the 
LD curve shifts down and to the left, as also shown in the fi gure. The vertical shift in 
the LD curve is likely to be smaller than the vertical shift of the LS curve, as shown in 
Figure 2A, if the expenditure of borrowers is more interest-elastic than the expendi-
ture of savers. The intersection of the grey curves shows the new equilibrium values, 
i2 and L2.
Tracing out the equilibrium interest rate for any assumed level of current 
income Y, one obtains the IS schedule plotted in Figure 2B. (Alternatively, for 
each possible interest rate i, the schedule shows the level of national income for 
which investment equals savings, as this is equivalent to equality between supply 
of and demand for funds.) The monetary policy reaction function of the central 
bank, indicating how the central bank’s interest-rate target will vary with the level of 
economic activity, is shown by the curve MP in this fi gure.3
If we suppose that the MP curve is drawn for a given infl ation rate, then the 
upward slope shown indicates a response of interest rates to the level of output (rela-
tive to trend or to potential), of a kind implied, for example, by the “Taylor rule” 
(Taylor, 1993)—that is, higher interest rates when output is high relative to trend or 
potential, and lower interest rates when output is low relative to trend or potential. 
In this case, the equilibrium level of output determined in Figure 2B depends on 
the infl ation rate; a graph showing how the equilibrium level of output would vary 
with infl ation yields an aggregate demand relation in infl ation–output space. Plot-
ting that relation along with a Phillips curve (or aggregate supply) relation between 
infl ation and output, one can then fi nally determine equilibrium output.4
This kind of model provides a straightforward account of the way in which a 
central bank’s interest-rate policy affects the level of economic activity (and also the 
infl ation rate, once one adjoins a Phillips curve to the model). However, this model 
of the credit market—in which ultimate savers lend directly to ultimate borrowers so 
that the interest rate received by savers is the same as that paid by borrowers—clearly 
omits some important features of actual fi nancial systems. In actual economies, we 
observe multiple interest rates that do not move perfectly together. Changes in 
spreads between certain of these interest rates have been important indicators of 
changing fi nancial conditions, both during the recent housing boom and during 
the subsequent crash, as is discussed further below.
3 In the case that monetary policy is assumed to correspond to some fi xed supply of money, then the 
MP curve becomes simply the Hicksian LM curve. However, an upward-sloping relation of the kind 
shown in the fi gure will exist under many other hypotheses, including ones more descriptive of actual 
central bank behavior than the Hicksian construct. On the relation between IS–MP analysis and the older 
IS–LM analysis, see, for example, Romer (2000) in this journal.
4 Alternatively, one can substitute the infl ation rate implied by the Phillips curve (for a given level of 
output) into the central bank reaction function, and plot the resulting relation for i as a function of Y 
as the curve MP. In this case, MP slopes upward, as shown, even if the central bank’s reaction function 
responds only to infl ation; and the equilibrium shown in Figure 2B already takes account of the endo-
geneity of the infl ation rate.
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Introducing Multiple Interest Rates
Here I illustrate one way to introduce multiple interest rates into this model. 
Suppose that instead of directly lending to ultimate borrowers themselves, savers 
fund intermediaries, who use these funds to lend to (or acquire fi nancial claims 
on) the ultimate borrowers. Then, it becomes necessary to distinguish between the 
interest rate i s (the rate paid to savers) at which intermediaries are able to fund 
themselves and the interest rate i b (the borrowing or loan rate) at which ultimate 
borrowers are able to fi nance additional current expenditure. We can still think in 
terms of the two schedules shown in Figure 2A, but now the LS schedule represents 
the supply of funding for intermediaries rather than the supply of loans to ultimate 
borrowers, and we must now recognize that the supply of funding and the demand 
for loans are functions of two different interest rates. Hence the equilibrium level 
of lending L can be at a point other than the one where the two schedules cross, as 
shown in Figure 3A.
What determines the equilibrium relation between the two interest rates i s and 
i b ? Given the funding supply and loan demand curves (which means, given the 
values of a set of variables that include the current value of income Y ), we can deter-
mine the unique volume of intermediation that is consistent with any given spread 
ω between i b and i s. If the funding supply curve LS and the loan demand curve LD 
have the slopes shown, then a larger credit spread ω implies a lower equilibrium 
volume of intermediated credit L. This relation between the quantity of intermedi-
ated credit and the credit spread is graphed as the curve XD in Figure 3B, which we 
can think of as the “demand for intermediation.”
The demand for intermediation schedule XD indicates the degree to which 
borrowers are willing to pay an interest rate higher than the one required in order 
to induce savers to supply funds to fi nance someone else’s expenditure. This repre-
sents a profi t opportunity for intermediaries, to the extent that they are able to 
arrange for the transfer of funds at suffi ciently low cost. The volume of lending that 
actually occurs, though, will also depend on the capacity of the fi nancial sector to 
supply this service at a margin low enough for the services to be demanded.
The corresponding “supply of intermediation” schedule, indicating the credit 
spread required to induce fi nancial institutions to intermediate a certain volume 
of credit between savers and ultimate borrowers, is depicted by the curve XS in 
Figure 3B. This curve refl ects the consequences of profi t maximization by inter-
mediaries, where the intermediaries in question need not be understood to consist 
solely or even primarily of traditional commercial banks. Both the equilibrium credit 
spread and the equilibrium volume of credit are then determined by the intersec-
tion between the XS and XD schedules. And given an equilibrium credit spread ω, 
determined in Figure 3A, one can use Figure 3A to determine the two interest rates.
Determinants of the Supply of Intermediation
The structural relationship represented by the supply of intermediation 
schedule XS in Figure 3B can be motivated in various ways. One model assumes 
that intermediaries have costs of originating and servicing loans, or of managing 
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Notes: i s is the interest rate paid to savers, at which intermediaries are able to fund themselves, and i b is the interest 
rate (the borrowing or loan rate) at which ultimate borrowers are able to fi nance additional current expenditure. 
In this fi gure, LS schedule represents the supply of funding for intermediaries, the LD schedule is the loan demand 
schedule, and these schedules are functions of two different interest rates. Hence the equilibrium level of lending L
can be at a point other than the one where the two schedules cross, as shown in Figure 3(a). ω is the spread between 
i b and i s. Given the LS and LD curves we can determine the unique volume of intermediation that is consistent with 
any given spread ω. This relation between the quantity of intermediated credit and the credit spread is graphed as 
the curve XD in panel B, which we can think of as the “demand for intermediation.” The corresponding “supply of 
intermediation” schedule XS indicates the credit spread required to induce fi nancial institutions to intermediate a 
certain volume of credit between savers and ultimate borrowers.
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their portfolios, so that in a competitive equilibrium, the rate i b at which they are 
willing to lend (or the return that they will require on assets that they purchase) will 
exceed their cost of funds i s by a spread that refl ects the marginal cost of lending. 
This marginal cost may be increasing in the volume of lending by the intermediary 
if the production function for loans involves diminishing returns to increases in the 
variable factors, owing to the fi xity of some factors (such as specialized expertise or 
facilities that cannot be expanded quickly).5
Probably a more important determinant of the supply of intermediation derives 
from the limited capital of intermediaries—or, more fundamentally, the limited 
capital of the “natural buyers” of the debt of the ultimate borrowers—together with 
limits on the degree to which these natural buyers are able to leverage their posi-
tions. The market for the debt of the ultimate borrowers may be limited to a narrow 
class of “natural buyers” for any of a variety of reasons: special expertise may be 
required to evaluate such assets; other costs of market participation may be lower 
for certain investors; or the natural buyers may be less risk averse, or less uncertainty 
averse, or more optimistic about returns on the particular assets.
Leverage may also be constrained for any of a variety of reasons. The recent 
literature has emphasized two broad types of constraints. On one hand, there may 
be a limit on the size of the losses that the intermediary would be subject to in 
bad states of the world, relative to its capital; such limits may result from regula-
tory capital requirements, or (the case of greatest relevance in the recent crisis) 
such limits may be imposed by the intermediary’s creditors, who are unwilling to 
supply additional funding if the leverage constraint is exceeded (as in Zigrand, 
Shin, and Danielsson, 2010; Adrian, Moench, and Shin, 2010b; Adrian and Shin, 
forthcoming b; Beaudry and Lahiri, 2010).6
Alternatively, intermediaries may raise funds by pledging particular assets as 
collateral for individual loans, and the amount that they can borrow may be limited 
by the value of available collateral. Gârleanu and Pedersen (2010) and Ashcraft, 
Gârleanu, and Pedersen (forthcoming) consider the consequences of collateral 
constraints in a model where the fraction of each asset’s value that can be borrowed 
using that asset as collateral is among the defi ning characteristics of the asset. 
Geanakoplos (1997, 2003, 2010) instead proposes a theory in which margin require-
ments are endogenously determined in competitive markets.
Under these types of theories, the capital of intermediaries becomes a crucial 
determinant of the supply of intermediation. For a given quantity of capital, the 
5 This is one of two relatively reduced-form models of endogenous credit spreads considered in the 
monetary dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model we present in Cúrdia and Woodford (2009). 
The device of a “loan production function” is also used in Goodfriend and McCallum (2007) and in 
Gerali, Neri, Sessa, and Signoretti (2010).
6 The “value-at-risk constraint” assumed by authors such as Zigrand, Shin, and Danielsson (2010), Adrian, 
Moench, and Shin (2010b), and Adrian and Shin (forthcoming b) is an example of a constraint of this 
form. Beaudry and Lahiri (2010) impose a similar constraint by simply assuming that intermediaries can 
sell only riskless debt. The constraint assumed by Adrian and Shin (forthcoming b) is formally equivalent 
to the one assumed by Beaudry and Lahiri (2010), though the former authors prefer to interpret the 
constraint as one on value at risk.
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supply schedule XS will be upward sloping, as shown in Figure 3B, if the accept-
able leverage ratio is higher when the spread between the expected return on 
the assets in which intermediaries can invest and the rate they must pay on their 
liabilities is greater. Consider, for example, a value-at-risk constraint, that requires 
the future value of the intermediary’s assets to be worth at least some fraction k 
of the amount owed on its debt, with at least some probability 1 –  p; and suppose 
that the risky asset in which the intermediary invests will pay at least a fraction s of 
its expected payoff with probability 1 –  p. Then the value-at-risk constraint is satis-
fi ed if and only if the intermediary’s leverage ratio (debt as a fraction of the total 
value of its assets) is no greater than s/k times the factor (1 + i b)/(1 +  i s), where 
i b is the expected return on the risky asset and i s is the rate that the intermediary 
must pay on its debt. Thus the acceptable leverage ratio, and correspondingly the 
maximum value of assets that the intermediary can acquire, will be an increasing 
function of the credit spread.
The IS–MP Model with Credit Frictions
The equilibrium credit spread and volume of credit shown in Figure 3A are 
determined for a particular value of national income Y  ; because the schedules LS 
and LD depend on Y, as shown in Figure 2A, the location of the schedule XD (at 
least) in Figure 3B also depends on Y. For reasons already discussed above, a higher 
level of Y should shift LS to the right and LD to the left, and each of these effects 
results in a lower equilibrium value of the rate i s paid to savers, for any given position 
of the schedule XS. Hence we can once again derive an IS schedule, indicating the 
equilibrium value of i s for any assumed level of income Y, but now the IS schedule 
will also include a given assumption about the supply of intermediation.7
The resulting model makes many of the same qualitative predictions about the 
effects of economic disturbances or policy changes as the standard IS–MP model 
(which is simply the special case in which the curve XS is assumed to be horizontal 
at ω = 0). However, the dependence of the supply of intermediation on the capital 
of intermediaries provides a channel for the amplifi cation and propagation of the 
effects of economic disturbances. An increase in aggregate economic activity will 
generally increase the value of intermediaries’ assets (loans are more likely to be 
repaid, land prices increase with increases in income, and so on) and hence their 
net worth. This will allow additional borrowing by the intermediaries, and hence a 
larger volume of credit for any given credit spread. Thus, the supply of intermedia-
tion schedule XS will shift down and to the right. A reduction in the interest rate 
7 In fact, we can now solve for both i s and i b as functions of Y, but it is the relation between i s and Y 
that is relevant for the IS–MP diagram, since it is i s—the rate at which intermediaries are able to fund 
themselves—that corresponds to the operating target of the central bank. Plotting again the reaction of 
the central bank’s target for i s to changes in economic activity as a curve MP, we again have a diagram of 
exactly the kind shown in Figure 2B to determine simultaneously the equilibrium values of the interest 
rate and output; the only important difference is that now we must clarify that the interest rate on the 
vertical axis is the policy rate i s rather than the borrowing rate i b. Once the equilibrium values of Y and 
i s have been determined, they can be transferred back to Figures 3A and B to determine the implied 
equilibrium values of i b and L as well.
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i s at which intermediaries are able to fund themselves can also increase intermedi-
aries’ net worth, if (as is often the case) they fund longer-term assets with short-term 
borrowing that they must roll over, and in this case a reduction in i s will shift the XS 
curve down and to the right as well.
Each of these effects will make the IS curve fl atter (more interest-elastic) than 
it would otherwise be.8 This means that a shift in the MP curve—due either to a 
change in monetary policy or to a supply-side disturbance that shifts the aggregate-
supply curve—will have a larger effect on output as a consequence of these “fi nancial 
accelerator” effects. Bernanke and Gertler (1995) discuss evidence for the impor-
tance of such effects in the case of monetary policy shocks. Moreover, if a disturbance 
leads to an increase or decrease in the capital of the intermediary sector, the altered 
level of capital is likely to persist for some time. This can result in effects on economic 
activity that are more persistent than the initial disturbance.
The presence of an upward-sloping XS curve (representing credit frictions) 
essentially makes the IS curve steeper, and consequently acts to dampen the effects 
on aggregate output of disturbances that shift the MP curve, to the extent that 
the XS schedule is not itself shifted by the disturbances. In fact, however, the XS 
schedule may well shift, in which case the net effect may well be to amplify output 
fl uctuations, rather than to dampen them.
Consequences of Shifts in the Supply of Intermediation
A more important consequence of this extension of the model is the fact that 
shifts in the XS schedule—for either exogenous or endogenous reasons—become 
an additional source of variations in aggregate demand, and hence in economic 
activity and infl ation.9 A disruption of the supply of intermediation will shift the 
XS schedule up, so that fi nancial intermediaries supply less credit at every level 
of the credit spread ω. As shown in Figure 4A an upward shift in XS results in a 
higher equilibrium credit spread, and a lower volume of lending, for any given level 
of economic activity (refl ected in the location of the XD schedule in the fi gure). 
Transferring this larger spread back to Figure 3A, one observes that the implied 
value of i s will be smaller, and the implied value of i b higher, for the given value of 
Y. Because this is true for each possible value of Y, the IS schedule is shifted down 
and to the left, as shown in Figure 4B. (Note that IS plots the equilibrium value of 
i s rather than that of i b, because the policy reaction function specifi es a target for 
i s rather than for i b.) In the absence of any change in the monetary policy reaction 
8 Of course, these reasons for the IS curve to be fl atter must be balanced against the observation that a 
steeper XS curve for a given level of capital in the intermediary sector will imply a steeper IS curve. This 
is why the degree of amplifi cation from credit frictions that is found in quantitative dynamic stochastic 
general equilibrium models is sometimes quite modest.
9 The empirical dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models of Christiano, Motto, and Rostagno 
(2010) and Gilchrist, Ortiz, and Zakrajsek (2009) each attribute a substantial fraction of the short-run 
variability of real GDP to disturbances that vary the severity of fi nancial frictions.
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Figure 4
Effects of a Disruption of Credit Supply
Notes: XS and XD are the supply and demand for intermediation. ω is the spread between i b, the interest 
rate for borrowers, and i s, the interest rate for savers. The IS schedule shows the equilibrium interest 
rate for any assumed level of current income Y, and MP is the monetary policy reaction function (MP).
A: Effects on the Equilibrium Credit Spread ω and Volume of Lending L
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function, the upward shift in XS should result in both a decline in the policy interest 
rate and a contraction of real activity.10
This prediction matches the consequences observed, for example, when the 
Carter administration imposed credit controls in the second quarter of 1980. This 
policy was followed by a contraction in real GDP at a rate of minus 8 percent per 
year in that quarter, while the federal funds rate also fell from a level over 17 percent 
per annum in April to only 9 percent by July 1980. The effects of a policy tightening 
of this kind cannot be understood as a shift of the MP curve (or LM curve) in a 
conventional IS–MP (or IS–LM) diagram, but they are easily understood when one 
realizes how changes in the supply of intermediation schedule should be expected 
to shift the IS curve.
The dependence of the supply of intermediation on the capital of interme-
diaries also introduces an important channel through which additional types of 
disturbances can affect aggregate activity. Any disturbance that impairs the capital 
of the banking sector will shift the schedule XS up and to the left, with the effects 
just discussed. This means that shocks that might seem of only modest signifi cance 
for the aggregate economy—in terms, say, of the total value of business losses that 
directly result from the shock—can have substantial aggregate effects if the losses 
in question happen to be concentrated in highly leveraged intermediaries, who 
suffer signifi cant reductions in their capital as a result. This was an important reason 
for the dramatic aggregate effects in 2008–2009 of the losses in the U.S. subprime 
mortgage market.
The supply of intermediation can also shift as a result of factors other than 
a change in the capital of intermediaries; in particular, leverage constraints can 
tighten or loosen, as a result of changes in the attitudes of intermediaries’ creditors 
regarding the acceptable degree of leverage, or in the margin requirements associ-
ated with borrowing against the securities that intermediaries hold. Gorton and 
Metrick (2009), Adrian and Shin (2009), and Geanakoplos (2010) have all stressed 
the importance of increases in margin requirements in the overnight repurchase 
(or “repo”) market as a factor that contracted the supply of credit in 2008 and 2009.
Even when shocks to the supply of intermediation originate in a tightening of 
leverage constraints and/or margin constraints owing to an increased assessment 
of the risk associated with intermediaries’ assets, the effects of the shocks will be 
amplifi ed by the dependence of the supply of intermediation on the capital of the 
intermediary sector. Intermediaries that are forced to sell assets as a result of tight-
ened leverage constraints are likely to suffer losses, and more so to the extent that 
many of them are forced to sell similar assets at the same time, or to the extent 
that they are the only “natural buyers” of the assets in question. These losses will 
then further reduce their capital, further reducing the amount that they are able 
10 In this respect the framework sketched here agrees with the one proposed by Bernanke and Blinder 
(1988), who refer to the relation that I call the IS curve as the “commodities and credit curve” instead, 
precisely because it is shifted by credit-supply shocks in addition to the usual determinants of the IS 
curve. The framework proposed here differs from that of Bernanke and Blinder primarily in offering a 
different model of the supply of intermediation.
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to borrow, and hence requiring further asset sales. The result is a vicious spiral 
that under some circumstances can substantially reduce credit supply. The resulting 
contraction of aggregate output may result in further losses to the banks, further 
reducing their capital, and hence tightening credit supply even more.
The Most Recent U.S. Credit Cycle
Understanding variations in fi nancial conditions over the most recent credit 
cycle requires attention to the behavior of multiple interest rates, not just the federal 
funds rate that is targeted by the Federal Reserve. As shown in Figure 5, the Fed 
Open Market Committee raised its target for the funds rate to a higher level during 
the period 2006–07; but fi nancial conditions did not tighten as much as one might 
expect from the increase in the funds rate. First of all, spending decisions depend 
more on the level of long-term interest rates, which in turn depend on the expected 
average level of short rates over the coming decade, rather than the current level 
of short rates alone. Since there was good reason to regard the low level of the 
federal funds rate in 2003–04 as a temporary anomaly,11 the long rate implied by the 
expected average future level of the short rates did not greatly increase as a result of 
the increase in the funds rate between 2004 and 2006.
Moreover, yields on long-term Treasury bonds did not rise by even this much. 
The term premium, which indicates the amount by which the actual yield on a 
long-term bond exceeds the expected average level of short-term interest rates over 
the term to maturity of the bond, declined during this period, as Figure 5 illustrates 
for the case of a 10-year bond. In turn, the rates at which private parties can borrow 
are not those applicable to the U.S. Treasury; the fi gure also shows, for example, 
that the spread between the average yield on Baa-rated corporate bonds and 10-year 
Treasuries also fell between 2004 and 2006.12 Hence corporate borrowing costs actu-
ally fell, despite the increase in the federal funds rate, owing to the declines in the 
two spreads! In contrast, the increases in the two spreads during the fi nancial crisis 
greatly increased the cost of borrowing.
Even in the case of short-term borrowing, the federal funds rate alone is 
not always an adequate measure of money market conditions. Figure 5 also plots 
the spread between the three-month U.S. dollar London Interbank Offer Rate 
11 For example, see the “fi tted” long rates implied by the forecasting model of Kim and Wright (2005). 
Indeed, the series plotted in Figure 5 is taken from the estimates of Kim and Wright (2005); their series 
is updated at ⟨http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/researchdata.htm⟩.
12 The spread between yields on this class of moderately risky corporate bonds and on similar-maturity 
Treasury bonds is a commonly watched indicator of disturbances to the market for corporate debt, 
which is strongly correlated with variations in economic activity. Gilchrist, Ortiz, and Zakrajsek (2009) 
use an index of corporate bond spreads as a measure of the time-varying fi nancial wedge in an estimated 
monetary dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model and fi nd that the co-movements of the bond 
spreads with other aggregate variables are consistent with this interpretation.
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(LIBOR)13 and the overnight interest-rate rate swap (OIS) rate, which can be viewed 
as essentially a market forecast of the average level of the federal funds rate over that 
three-month period. The sharp increases in this spread during the crisis indicate 
that the short-term borrowing costs of many banks (especially late in 2008) were 
considerably higher than would be indicated by the federal funds rate.
It is popular to attribute the credit boom (at least in part) to the Federal Reserve 
having kept the federal funds rate “too low for too long,” but comparison of the 
path of the funds rate in Figure 5 with the measures of credit growth in Figure 1A 
shows that the increase in lending was greatest in 2006 and the fi rst half of 2007, 
after the federal funds rate had already returned to a level consistent with normal 
benchmarks. Instead, the fact that spreads were unusually low precisely during the 
period of strongest growth in lending—as can be seen by comparing the spreads 
13 The LIBOR rate is an average of quoted rates at which banks are able to borrow funds for a short term 
(3 months, in the case of the series plotted here) on an uncollateralized basis. It is important not only 
because it is the cost of additional funds for some banks, but because other lending rates—such as the 
interest rate at which commercial and industrial loans are available to fi rms under existing loan commit-
ments—are often tied to the LIBOR rate. For alternative interpretations of variations in the LIBOR–OIS 
spread, see Giavazzi (2008), Sarkar (2009), and Taylor and Williams (2009).
Figure 5
The Federal Funds Rate Target and Some Interest-rate Spreads
Sources: The FF target is from the Federal Reserve Board; the 10-year term premium was calculated by 
Don H. Kim and Jonathan H. Wright (available at the Federal Reserve Board website); the Baa–Treasury 
spread is from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis; the LIBOR-OIS spread is from Bloomberg.
Notes: The “FF target” is the Federal Funds rate target. The “10-year term premium” is the amount by 
which the yield on a 10-year bond exceeds the expected average level of short-term interest rates over 
the term to maturity of the bond. The “Baa–Treasury spread” is the spread between Baa-rated corporate 
bonds and 10-year Treasuries. The “LIBOR–OIS spread” is the spread between the three-month U.S. 
dollar London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) and the overnight interest-rate rate swap (OIS) rate.
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shown in Figure 5 with the quantities in Figure 1—indicates that an outward shift 
of the supply of intermediation schedule XS was responsible, rather than a move-
ment along this schedule in response to a loosening of monetary policy. The reason 
for the shift seems to have been an increased appetite of investors for purportedly 
low-risk short-term liabilities of very highly leveraged fi nancial intermediaries; in 
this journal, Brunnermeier (2009) details the changes in fi nancing patterns during 
this period.
The effects of such a shift were like those shown in Figure 4, but with the 
reverse sign; as a consequence, the Fed’s increase in the funds rate over the period 
between 2004 and 2006 did less to restrain demand than would ordinarily have been 
expected.14 The increase in the riskless short-term rate did reduce households’ and 
fi rms’ willingness to hold demand deposits, as a conventional money-demand equa-
tion would imply, and checkable deposits declined during this period, as shown in 
Figure 1B; but this did not prevent a net increase in the overall liabilities of fi nancial 
intermediaries, and hence in credit supply.
The fi nancial crisis that began in summer 2007 also originated in a change in 
the supply of intermediation. It began when increased perceptions of risk resulted 
in increases in the margin requirements demanded by creditors in short-term 
lending collateralized by mortgage-backed securities, creating a liquidity crisis for 
issuers of asset-backed commercial paper. The effect of deleveraging in this sector 
on the market value of mortgage-backed securities further impaired the capital of 
fi nancial intermediaries more broadly, requiring further deleveraging, in a vicious 
spiral: again, Brunnermeier (2009) describes this process in detail in this journal.
In terms of the model, the net result of both reductions in the acceptable degree 
of leverage and impairment of the capital of the fi nancial sector was a sharp leftward 
shift of the supply of intermediation XS. As illustrated by Figure 4, the result was a 
simultaneous contraction of the volume of lending, as shown in Figure 1, and an 
increase in spreads, as shown in Figure 5. The resulting leftward shift of the IS curve 
(Figure 4) meant a contraction of aggregate demand, despite the substantial cuts 
in the federal funds rate shown in Figure 5. The reduction in the riskless short-term 
rate caused an increased willingness to hold transactions deposits, and checkable 
deposits increased substantially, as seen in Figure 1B. But plentiful deposits were 
not enough to restore the fl ow of credit, for an inability to increase the volume of 
deposits was not the relevant constraint on the supply of credit.
Once this process was underway—and given that, for a time, it appeared 
that the crisis might spiral out of control—uncertainty about the macroeconomic 
environment likely caused a further leftward shift of the IS curve, by increasing 
precautionary saving and increasing the option value of deferring investment. 
Once the IS curve shifted suffi ciently far, it ceased to be possible to maintain 
14 Under this analysis, the fact that the Fed did not tighten policy even further can be said to have contrib-
uted to the credit boom. But the problem was not that the Fed failed to conform to the conventional 
benchmark provided by the “Taylor rule,” as argued by Taylor (2009), but rather that it followed it too 
faithfully, rather than taking account of the change in fi nancial conditions.
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output near potential through cuts in the federal funds rate alone, owing to the 
zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. Of course, the fact that reduced 
aggregate demand resulted in lower economic activity and employment, rather 
than simply in reductions in wages and prices to the extent needed to maintain 
full employment, depended on the stickiness of wages and prices, as described in 
standard textbook accounts.
Implications for Monetary Policy
To what extent does this extension of the standard model imply changes to the 
conventional conduct of monetary policy? 
Taking Account of Financial Conditions
The model’s most obvious implication is that decisions about interest-rate policy 
should take account of changes in fi nancial conditions—in particular, of changes in 
interest-rate spreads. Suppose that one’s goal is to set a value of the policy rate at each 
point in time that is consistent with output equal to potential (or, more precisely, 
the “natural rate of output” in the sense of Friedman, 1968). In the model sketched 
above, this interest rate can be determined at any time given two other numbers: 
1) the current value of the “natural rate of interest”—the real interest rate required 
for output equal to the natural rate, in the absence of fi nancial frictions15—converted 
into an equivalent nominal interest rate by adding the current expected infl ation 
rate, and 2) the current interest-rate spread ω.16
The model therefore suggests that changes in credit spreads should be an 
important indicator in setting the federal funds rate; the funds rate target should be 
lower than would otherwise be chosen, given other conditions, when credit spreads 
are larger. John Taylor (2008) has proposed, in this spirit, that his well-known 
rule for setting the federal funds rate target (explained in Taylor, 1993) should 
be modifi ed to specify a funds rate target equal to that prescribed by the standard 
“Taylor rule” minus the current value of the LIBOR–OIS spread shown in Figure 5. 
In Cúrdia and Woodford (2010a), my coauthor and I show, in the context of a 
New Keynesian dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with credit frictions, 
that such a modifi cation of the standard Taylor rule can improve the economy’s 
response to disturbances to the supply of intermediation.
15 This concept, derived from the ideas of Knut Wicksell, is discussed extensively in Woodford (2003, 
chap. 4). One might alternatively defi ne the natural rate as the real rate that would be required for 
output equal to the natural rate of output under the assumption of a credit spread equal to some normal 
(steady state) level; the important feature of the proposed defi nition is that it abstracts from the effects 
of variations in the size of credit frictions.
16 In Cúrdia and Woodford (2009), we derive an intertemporal version of the “IS curve” in which the 
credit spread appears as a shift factor. Gaspar and Kashyap (2006) were perhaps the fi rst to propose such 
a relation.
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Alternatively, a forecast-targeting approach to monetary policy of the kind I 
recommended in this journal in Woodford (2007)—in which the central bank’s 
target for the policy rate should be adjusted as necessary in order for its projections 
of infl ation and real activity to satisfy a quantitative target criterion—will automati-
cally incorporate responses to changes in fi nancial conditions to the extent that 
these shift the IS curve, as in the model sketched above. In addition, this alternative 
approach has the advantage of not requiring the central bank to focus on a single 
interest rate spread when multiple aspects of fi nancial conditions are each relevant 
to aggregate demand and supply determination.
“Unconventional” Monetary Policies
The model also implies that traditional interest-rate policy alone will not, in 
general, provide a fully adequate response to a disturbance to credit supply, no 
matter how large the cut in the policy rate that may be engineered. The reason is 
that even if a suffi cient reduction in the policy rate can offset the decline in aggre-
gate demand that would otherwise result from the shift in the IS curve, this does not 
fully undo the distortions created by the increase in credit spreads. To the extent 
that savers would be willing to supply additional funds at an interest rate lower than 
the rate at which borrowers would be willing to borrow additional funds, then there 
remains a misallocation of expenditure, even if the aggregate level of expenditure is 
optimal: on this point, in Cúrdia and Woodford (2009), my coauthor and I provide 
an explicit welfare analysis. Thus, to the extent that it is possible for policy to reduce 
the size of the credit spread, this is desirable, even when interest-rate policy is able 
to maintain output at potential.
But the case for acting to reduce credit spreads becomes even stronger if 
the policy rate is constrained by the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates. 
In the case of a large enough disturbance to the supply of intermediation, the IS 
curve may shift so far down to the left that the point on it corresponding to the 
natural rate of output may involve a negative nominal interest rate; for quanti-
tative examples, see Cúrdia and Woodford (2010b). In this case, conventional 
monetary policy is unable to achieve the required level of aggregate demand, 
because even a massive expansion of the supply of bank reserves cannot drive the 
policy rate below zero. (The Federal Reserve found itself in this situation after 
December 2008, as shown in Figure 5.) Under such circumstances, a policy that 
can reduce credit spreads can further increase aggregate demand (by shifting 
the IS curve to the right), despite the lack of room for any further reduction in 
the policy rate.
Broadly speaking, two types of “unconventional” central-bank policies can 
reduce credit spreads by shifting the supply of intermediation schedule XS to the 
right. One is the extension of credit to intermediaries by the central bank on easier 
terms than are available from private creditors; in particular, in the case that the 
relevant fi nancing constraint is the existence of too-high margin requirements for 
private lending using assets held by the intermediaries as collateral, the central 
bank may choose to lend against that collateral with a lower margin requirement. 
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Ashcraft, Gârleanu, and Pedersen (forthcoming) discuss the Federal Reserve’s Term 
Asset-Backed Lending Facility, which provided fi nancing for private purchases of 
asset-backed securities, as an example of a policy of this kind and present evidence 
of its success at reducing the spreads associated with asset-backed securities eligible 
for the program. Such a policy can relax the constraint on the size of intermediary 
balance sheets resulting from limited capital in the intermediary sector, by allowing 
increased leverage.
Alternatively, the central bank may directly purchase debt claims issued by 
private borrowers, so that total credit extended to the private sector can exceed 
the size of intermediary balance sheets. Examples of policies of this kind during 
the recent crisis include the Fed’s purchases of commercial paper through its 
Commercial Paper Funding Facility and its purchases of mortgage-backed secu-
rities and agency debt. On the motivation for and effects of these programs, 
see, for example, Adrian, Kimbrough, and Marchioni (2010), Gagnon, Raskin, 
Remache, and Sack (2010), and in this journal Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2010). 
In this case as well, the supply of intermediation XS is shifted to the right even 
though the equilibrium relation between the credit spread and the quantity of 
risky assets that can be held on the balance sheets of private intermediaries does 
not change.17
It should not be assumed that because it is possible in principle for the central 
bank to reduce equilibrium spreads through direct intervention in credit markets, 
it is therefore desirable for the central bank to intervene continually to maintain 
zero spreads. In Cúrdia and Woodford (2010b), we assume costs of central-bank 
lending to the private sector that imply that under normal circumstances, it 
will not be optimal for the central bank to hold assets other than highly liquid 
Treasury securities on its balance sheet; but even so, central-bank lending to the 
private sector can be justifi ed on welfare grounds in the case of a large enough 
disruption of credit supply. Gertler and Karadi (2010) reach a similar conclusion 
using a related model. 
Monetary Policy and Financial Stability
Finally, the fact that a reduction in the capital of intermediaries has an adverse 
effect on the supply of intermediation—which in turn can seriously disturb both aggre-
gate demand and the composition of expenditure—implies that it is desirable to reduce 
how frequently such crises occur. The role that monetary policy can or should play in 
this regard remains controversial. However, a crisis that sharply reduces intermediary 
capital can more easily occur, in the sense that the size of the required exogenous 
disturbance is smaller, when intermediaries are highly leveraged. Thus, while the 
increased volume of lending that a relaxation of leverage constraints makes possible 
17 Note that on this analysis, the effects of targeted central bank asset purchases have nothing to do with 
“quantitative easing,” as the effects do not depend on the purchases being fi nanced by an increase in 
bank reserves, nor do conditions in the market for bank reserves play any role in our analysis. See Cúrdia 
and Woodford (2010b) for further discussion.
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can improve the short-run allocation of resources, this benefi t must be weighed against 
the increased risk of occurrence of a crisis that will (if it occurs) increase distortions in 
the future, in ways that monetary policy will not then be able to counteract fully.
The model sketched here implies that increased leverage in the fi nancial sector 
is a natural consequence of looser monetary policy because of the effects of higher 
incomes on loan demand and supply, shown in Figure 2A. Other, more complex 
mechanisms, such as the model of misperception of risk by the funders of interme-
diaries proposed by Dubecq, Mojon, and Ragot (2009) can make this effect even 
stronger. Given this, the consequences of policy for fi nancial stability need to be 
considered in making interest-rate decisions, alongside the consequences of policy 
for aggregate economic activity and infl ation.
The nature of this consideration should not be completely symmetrical: 
marginal adjustments of interest rates always have consequences for output and 
infl ation, while they will have nonnegligible consequences for the risk of fi nancial 
instability only at certain times when the leverage is extreme enough for even small 
changes in asset values to have substantial effects on intermediary capital. Improved 
regulation and/or macroprudential supervision could further reduce the range of 
circumstances in which this consideration would matter for monetary policy deci-
sions; and this would be desirable, if possible, as freeing monetary policy to focus 
solely on output and infl ation stabilization should allow those goals to be more 
effectively achieved. But in the absence of a complete solution of that kind, it is 
diffi cult to defend the view that fi nancial stability can be ignored in monetary policy 
decisions; and the development of practical real-time indicators of risks to fi nancial 
stability is accordingly an important challenge of the present moment.
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